Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War

By Brian Freeman

Bowden, Mark. Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War. New York: Penguin Group, 2000.

After years of fierce battles between competing warlords, Somalia’s government is overthrown and the country is in complete chaos. These warlords destroy the agriculture of Somalia and use starvation as weapon. An estimated 300,000 Somalians died of starvation and another 1.5 million people suffering from malnutrition and diseases.

With hundreds of thousands dead and millions starving in the early 1990s, the United Nations voted to intervene militarily in Somalia to feed the starving people and begin the process of rebuilding the nation. United Nations, led by United States forces, met powerful resistance from the most powerful clan leader Mohammed Farrah Aidid. Several bloody incidents led the UN and former President Bill Clinton to conclude that Aidid was an obstacle and must be removed. Mark Bowden's Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War is a minute-by-minute reconstruction of one of the most paramount battles in the short, ill-fated American military campaign to capture and disrupt Mohammed Farrah Aidid in Mogadishu.

Originally former President George Bush Sr. ordered to send an overwhelming deployment of American military forces to help lead the United Nations operation to open relief supply routes against the depredations of Somali militias whose power struggles had caused the famine. The United Nations operation at first is extremely successful. However in late 1992 the most powerful clan Islamic Habr Gidr, headed by warlord Mohammed Farrah Aidid, attacked both UN and U.S. forces. President Bill Clinton changed the peacekeeping mission to an assault on Aidid and Habr Gidr. Clinton gives Special Forces Unit Task Force Ranger and Delta Force the job of capturing Aidid.

By this time, Aidid and his clan considered themselves at war with the United States. The planned raid launched on October 3, 1993, and was later called Black Hawk Down. Originally, the plan was to focus on the capture and meeting of two Aidid's senior advisors, reported to be in the most dangerous part of Mogadishu. The goal of the raid was to destabilize Mohammed Farrah Aidid’s clan politically after they failed to capture Aidid. This was the sixth raid of its kind consisting of Army Rangers and Delta Force who were so confident from previous quick victory missions that they neglected to properly equip themselves with night-vision devices, water, and body armor panels.

The mission was led by elite Delta Force soldiers that would go in by helicopter to kidnap the two top Lieutenants of Aidid's clan. The Rangers were given the job of securing the perimeter and escorting convoy that contains the captured Lieutenants of Aidid's clan out of the city. The convoy consisted with 160 men, 19 aircraft, 9 hummers, and 3 five-ton trucks. The operation from the start was marred with problems and would turn disastrous when two Blackhawk helicopters were shot down. After 27 hours of fierce fighting, 18 U.S soldiers are dead and over 70 injured. The Somalian death count was much higher with over 1000 injured and 500 dead.

The planned assault was only supposed to take an hour and was launched into the most dangerous part of Mogadishu. The entire mission changed from capture and extract to search and rescue when the first of five Blackhawks crashes inside the city. Originally commanders thought it was highly unlikely that Somalis could shoot down helicopters with rocket propelled grenades. By the end day the U.S. Military saw five shot down, with two crashing in the city and three limped back to base before crash-landing.

Several Ranger and Delta elements of the attack force fought their way to the crashed chopper and attempted to secure the area. Not only are members of the militia attempting to prevent the Special Forces from securing the area, but the citizens of Mogadishu, who were sick of U.S interference in their country, also take arms. Gunfire is coming from all sides when the second Blackhawk is shot down. The Special Forces unit trying to contain the perimeter around the first crash site were then ordered to spilt up and set up a perimeter around the second crash. While the main convoy containing the captured Lieutenants attempts from the target location to the crash site. The Somalia militia set up road blocks making the convoy disoriented in the city streets. They drove around in circles through heavy fire looking for the crash sites. As the convoy losses mounted and with the two Lieutenants killed in the action, they were forced to return to base, leaving about 100 Americans surrounded by fierce militia at the crash site.

One of the most memorable moments of the book is when snipers Gary Gordon and Randy Shughart volunteer to secure the second crash site until help can arrive, although it arrived far too late. The two snipers along with the help Mike Durant commit a patriotic Alamo last stand and fight to the bitter end. The two snipers fall in combat and Durant is taken hostage, but because of the snipers bravery, they both win Medals of Honor.

The American soldiers are forced to fight through the night with ammo running out and no water. U.S. forces send air support and helicopters continue strafing runs support but this only buys time. The U.S. soldiers around the crash site needed to be evacuated. It is well past midnight before an armored column, which should have been sent originally, could be brought together. The armor units, supported by elements of the 10th Mountain Division, began the rescue, starting with the trapped Americans. Operating in heavy fire, the column finally extracted the pinned-down forces and their captives.

When images of American corpses being dragged through the streets of Somilia and Michael Durant looking bloodied and battered surface, all of Washington is asking what went wrong. A lot of blame was directed about having American troops under United Nations command, but the majority of the blame focused on the Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, which ultimately caused him to lose his job. Les Aspin repeatedly refused to send armor personal carriers and tanks into region.

The lost of American military life forced President Bill Clinton to terminate the hunt for Aidid and pull Task Force Ranger out quickly. A few months later, all US forces withdrew completely from Somalia and UN nation-building effort collapsed. Mark Bowden makes it clear that the failed mission in Somalia had a “profound cautionary influence” on American military policy for years to come. The United States would refuse to send ground troops and conduct. Mark Bowden has taken his award winning series of newspaper articles written for the Philadelphia Inquirer and made it a truly great book about the spirit, professionalism, valor, skill, and nobility of the American fighting forces involved in this conflict. Bowden’s research of first hand source material, documentation of his sources, and reliance on first hand interviews is first rate and qualifies this book as an excellent work of history, not merely a piece of investigative journalism.

Book Review: Wright, Evan. Generation Kill

By: Brian Freeman

Wright, Evan. Generation Kill. Berkley Publishing Group, 2008.

During the second Gulf War for Operation Iraqi Freedom the Pentagon placed over 775 reporters and photographers as embedded journalists. The U.S. invasion of Iraq is the most widely and closely reported wars in military history. Generation Kill tells the uncensored no hold bars story of the First Recon Marine Battalion in the early days of the invasion in Iraq.

The majority of journalists reported on heroic battles, brave men, and respectable soldiers. Rolling Stone writer Evan Wright spent the first two months of the invasion with the First Reconnaissance Marine Battalion‎ and reported on uncensored soldiers who had been desensitized to violence by videogames and Hollywood movies. Wright asked to join a front-line, first-in unit of the Operation Iraqi Freedom during the initial invasion of 2003. He rode into Iraq with the First Reconnaissance Battalion Marines—the Marine Corps' special operations unit whose motto is "Swift, Silent, Deadly."

Wright’s original account of life with the marines, The Killer Elite, was published as a three-part series in the Rolling Stone. The article won Wright a National Magazine Award for Excellence in Reporting in 2004. In the beginning, he was ignored by the Marines, who refused to be interviewed or even speak to the reporter. However, many of the Marine soldiers were familiar with Wright’s previous work with Hustler magazine, and he soon gained popularity among the soldiers.

Wright found that pop culture influenced Marine soldiers, who were focused on killing as many Hajji’s as possible. (Hajji is the Marine slang term for Iraqi military or insurgent personnel.) The Marines quickly explain to Wright the First Marine Recon objective which is to drive ahead and create chaos on the battlefield ahead of the main force. The Marines know Wright is terrified, so they made him ride in the lead vehicle.

Much to the dismay of the Marines and Wright, the commander of First Recon nicknamed Stephen “Godfather” Ferrando, was anxious to earn his battle stripes. Ferrando often volunteered the entire unit for various tasks, even if they were not specially trained or equipped for the mission. Stephen “Godfather” Ferrando earned the nickname because his vocal chords were removed after a bout with cancer, causing him to speak like Marlon Brando in the noted film.

Wright depicts First Recon Marines once being volunteered by Ferrando to invade entire villages with open top hummers, and another time to capture heavily fortified airfield that luckily had been deserted before operation started.

Many of the Marines of First Recon do not even have Hummer licenses, and the vehicles themselves lack not only armor, but roofs, doors and windscreens. Also a majority of Hummers battle turrets do not turn and often jam on firing. Before every military action the Marines are forced to pillage villages for parts or steal from other units to keep the vehicles running.

The entire command leadership would be criticized throughout the entire book by Wright and the Marines. They often complain to Wright about certain officers and about decisions made at the higher levels. According to Wright, the soldiers had the right to complain about the often incompetent command leadership.

Most notably, the soldiers complained of any command from Captain Craig “Encino Man” Schwetje, whose orders were ignored on numerous occasions. Two of the most critical mistakes Schwetje makes were attempting to call an airstrike on his location and leaving a supply truck filled with thousands of pounds C4 explosive and food unguarded. Schwetje assumed the Iraqis would be happy for the Marines liberating the country and that they would have no need for thousands of pounds of C4.

Wright not only shows writes about Schwetje’s ineptitude, but he quotes him saying, “Check it out, I taped my windows so I could turn my laptop on without enemies seeing the light. Cool, huh?” This action causes his Humvee driver to run off the road several times and miss important roads junctions. It is only a brief description of the number of mistakes by commanders of the recon unit, all of which are well documented throughout the book.

Despite the problems the Marines did their job, and did it well, with a strange kind of cynical patriotism. They suffer minor injuries while killing hundreds of Iraqis, and few enemy soldiers survive their attacks. Those who survive the Marines’ attack often stumble out of ruined buildings to surrender, some crying and defecating with fear. The elite Marines leave a trail of destruction and death in their tracks. They face almost no challenge they can not handle and as Wright shows the Marines main problem was trying to sort out civilians from enemy fighters.

While the author is clearly against the war, this does not interfere with his sympathy for and portrayal of the troops and his ear for brilliant quotes. Wright captures a number conversation and quotes which helps the reader bond and understand each man of the unit. Wright captures one of the best quotes from Cpl. Ray Person saying,

“Look at this shit. How come we can't ever invade a cool country, like chicks in bikinis, you know? How come counties like that don't ever need Marines? I'll tell you why, it's lack of pussy that fucks countries up, lack of pussy is the root fucking cause of all global instability. If more Hajis were getting quality pussy, there'd be no reason for us to come over and fuck em up like this, cause a nut-busting Haji, is a happy Haji…. No, Saddam is just part of the problem, if Saddam invested more in the pussy infrastructure of Iraq than he did in his fucking gay ass army, then this country would be no more fucked up than say, Mexico.”

Uncensored quotes like this, memorable and important, are found many times throughout Generation Kill give the reader a better understanding of each solider.

This book is not is a comprehensive overview of the run-up to the war or of the overall strategy employed by the U.S. military. Wright’s Generation Kill is about first hand experience of war and soldiers that fight it. Reading like a fiction book, he chronicles not just battlefield experiences, but each man both as an individual and as a part of the battalion.

Generation Kill is not for the faint of heart. Wright doesn't shy away from showing the sheer horror of war, such as the case of the civilian Iraqi driver who had been accidental shot by 50 caliber machine gun at road block. The Iraqi driver had the top of his head scooped out by a bullet, leaving him brain dead but technically alive, with a beating heart and working lungs as he sat at the wheel of his vehicle. He does not paper over Saddam's brutal regime, and there are several scenes in which he depicts cheering crowds lined the streets to joyously welcome the Marines.
Generation Kill reveals raw truth about how Operation Iraqi Freedom was fought and takes reader and places them on the streets with force that paved the way. The book is not a comprehensive study of the war but a personal experience. Because of the personal experience, it forces us to consider America's overall strategy and possibly self-defeating strategy.

Overall Generation Kill is a great a tale of the battle-forged camaraderie and brutality of war. Wright’s focus is on the elite group of highly trained troops, who were raised on hip-hop, violent video games, and often offensive and racist cartoons, such as South Park. They are a completely different generation of soldiers from the men who fought in World War II and Vietnam.

Write wrote in his prologue: “Culturally, these marines would be virtually unrecognizable to their forebears in the ‘Greatest Generation.”

Book Review: Cobra II - The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq

By Brian Freeman

Gordon, Michael, and Bernard Trainor. Cobra II- The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq. New York: Random House, 2007.


The 2003 Iraq War is a war that has taken thousands of Iraqis and American lives and continues until today with no end in sight for the foreseeable future. Cobra II- The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq is a book which takes its title from the Army name for the drive to Baghdad. Cobra II describes the entire political events and the war while emphasizing on the rushed and poor preparations for what to do after the invasion. It also focuses on the competing political relations between the major players inside the Bush administration. Ultimately Cobra II is the most comprehensive analysis and history of the Iraq written today. It will be several decades before millions of classified documents on the war will be released before historians can write a true history of the war, but Cobra II will be the measurement on how those books should be written.

Authors of Cobra II Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor bring together their knowledge to develop a factual, balanced, and comprehensive book. This is not the authors’ first collaboration. Their first book written in 1993 entitled the General's War is considered by many as the definitive history of the 1991 Iraq War. Bernard E. Trainor is a retired Marine Corps lieutenant general and former New York Times chief military correspondent. He is now a noted academic his military intelligence, and his military ties can be seen throughout the book.

Michael R. Gordon is the chief military correspondent for the New York Times, and experienced the war while embedded in U.S.-dominated coalition's land command during the invasion. Authors Michael Gordon and Bernard Trainor meticulously gather all available sources and interview a number of high ranking officials to give Cobra II a very comprehensive and dependable list of sources.

The authors’ present evidence that makes it is very clear that Bush administration had the invasion or the toppling of Saddam Hussein on the list of objectives early in the administration planning. The politicians battle over the planning are fascinating to read in Cobra II and is one of highest points of the book. A number of high ranking Bush administration officials from Colin Powell to Donald Rumsfeld argue over the planning. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld fought heavily with military planners and Joint Chiefs of Staff on how to invade and troop numbers. Donald Rumsfeld, who shared the idea along with Bush, did not see the need for lengthy peacekeeping and nation-building, such as the U.S. had undertaken in the Balkans under President Clinton. This viewpoint is shared by number individuals inside the higher cabinet of the administration. Many of the high ranking officials inside the administration believed in the hopelessly optimistic Central Intelligence Agency predictions that Iraq units would surrender ultimately embrace American liberators.

Because of this optimistic thinking, Rumsfeld wanted a smaller, streamlined invasion force like the one used in Afghanistan. U.S. Military leaders declared Afghanistan as a completely different war and recommended that close to 500,000 troops would be needed, especially for the post-war phase. Rumsfeld was irritated at the first presentation of such numbers, and believed 125,000, "and even that was probably too many," could do the job.

Determined to reduce the number of troops for the invading force, Rumsfeld dismissed advice from experts inside and outside government who argued for a larger contingent troops sent into Iraq. Rumsfeld’s efforts reeked havoc with the military's preparations, according to the authors. The numerous planning changes and dependence on technology caused the military to become extremely disorganized for the war. Despite the disorganization from all the planning iterations the U.S. military attacked Iraq with the number of troops Rumsfeld initially wanted completed the objective of removing Saddam Hussein from power.

However because so much planning was focused on the invasion and numbers needed to invade Iraq meant that little attention was paid to what the military terms "Phase IV," or post-conflict operations. With inadequate troop numbers to contain the anarchy that followed the fall of the Hussein regime, the US military would be the owners of a country in pure chaos. The authors interview a number of the US military leaders in Cobra II and make it clear is that with the extremely poor post war planning, combined with the lack of enough troops to restore order, caused the United States to fail the objective of rebuilding a democratic Iraq and lose the initiative in the weeks following the invasion

The authors state that planning for the rebuilding of Iraq be given to the Defense Department by Secretary Rumsfeld. However General Franks, whose responsibility it was to ensure that the United States military was prepared for the occupation, "seemed content to leave the lion's share of the Phase IV planning to others in the government," the authors write. The authors make it clear as late as Feb. 20, 2003, barely a month before the invasion, "there was no plan" for the rebuilding of Iraq.

Cobra II provides a number fascinating accounts into what went wrong in the first weeks after the fall of Baghdad. Playing out like a cheap horror film, one of the most compelling moments is when General Garner is replaced by Ambassador Paul Bremer. Paul Bremer makes a number of critical errors which leads to Iraq disorder. Thousands of Iraq men became unemployed after Bremer’s first error of abolishing the Iraq Army, which was the largest employer of the country. Then Bremer only compounds the situation by preventing the United States military from holding local elections for fear that "the wrong guy" might win.

Consequently, once American forces seized Baghdad, U.S. troop deployments were curtailed and units were instructed to prepare for a rapid drawdown—even while the Iraq police and military forces that the administration expected to preserve order were being disbanded. This occurs while U.S. field commanders realize that their principal enemy is not the Iraq army but irregular forces many of them foreigners employing guerrilla tactics are the true enemy.

Cobra II does an excellent job no placing blame entirely on one person. The complete lack of planning for the rebuilding, number of critical errors and political misjudgments all contribute to the failure in Iraq.

A number of logistical problems would also cause problems for rebuilding Iraq. The military found that destroying communications was key to quickly taking over also greatly hinder post-war operation. The little bit of planning for rebuilding Iraq was to use oil revenues to help with reconstruction. However, the Iraq oil infrastructure was almost non-existent and was the target of constant insurgent attack. As for the Iraq police, the CIA assessment was that they were apolitical and well-trained. Yet the reality was they were poorly-trained and incapable of taking security roles for Iraq.

The authors show how a number of people were not alone in making major miscalculations. They place blame on number of players from Rumsfeld wanting smaller troop numbers to Tommy Franks who refused to politically battle Rumsfeld over troop numbers. The authors’ place present an abundant list of individuals who made mistakes in judgment. The book shows the failure at the highest levels of the command structure, effected the soldiers on the ground, and the overall strategic objective. The authors do a fine job making one of the most lop-sided campaigns in memory interesting, and do not focus on a particular unit.

In one’s opinion, following the troops invading Iraq is unnecessary in Cobra II and not following the troops could have possibly shortened the 600 page book greatly. However the war stories do help to tie into bigger picture and give Cobra II a human aspect. This book does a great job in showing how the surprises that the Americans encountered in resistance turn out to be compelling at times. It would be have interesting to see the authors focus more on what was going inside the administration during the heavy post war fighting hopefully in possibly a sequel to Cobra II it would be nice to see key policymakers such as Vice President Cheney and Rumsfeld who declined the authors' requests for interviews to be interviewed. It is one’s opinion that views of those at the center of the war politically should be captured. Still, Cobra II even with its fault stands as the best account of the war to date.

Cobra II is meticulous and properly planned which is completely opposite of the war that it covers. The narrative reading is authoritative, the human aspects of conflict give the reader brief insight of the war. Cobra II offers readers a real and instructive lesson on the consequences of inadequate strategic planning. Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq, is by far the most factual, non bias, and comprehensive book written to date about the 2003 Iraq invasion.

Gordon and Trainer present the facts as they are currently known, and let the reader judge who is truly to blame for the blunder in Iraq. Cobra II is by far the best book on the subject and will likely remain so for years to come, and it will likely be the benchmark by which other histories of the Iraq invasion are measured.