By Brian FreemanGordon, Michael, and Bernard Trainor. Cobra II- The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq. New York: Random House, 2007.
The 2003 Iraq War is a war that has taken thousands of Iraqis and American lives and continues until today with no end in sight for the foreseeable future. Cobra II- The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq is a book which takes its title from the Army name for the drive to Baghdad. Cobra II describes the entire political events and the war while emphasizing on the rushed and poor preparations for what to do after the invasion. It also focuses on the competing political relations between the major players inside the Bush administration. Ultimately Cobra II is the most comprehensive analysis and history of the Iraq written today. It will be several decades before millions of classified documents on the war will be released before historians can write a true history of the war, but Cobra II will be the measurement on how those books should be written.
Authors of Cobra II Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor bring together their knowledge to develop a factual, balanced, and comprehensive book. This is not the authors’ first collaboration. Their first book written in 1993 entitled the General's War is considered by many as the definitive history of the 1991 Iraq War. Bernard E. Trainor is a retired Marine Corps lieutenant general and former New York Times chief military correspondent. He is now a noted academic his military intelligence, and his military ties can be seen throughout the book.
Michael R. Gordon is the chief military correspondent for the New York Times, and experienced the war while embedded in U.S.-dominated coalition's land command during the invasion. Authors Michael Gordon and Bernard Trainor meticulously gather all available sources and interview a number of high ranking officials to give Cobra II a very comprehensive and dependable list of sources.
The authors’ present evidence that makes it is very clear that Bush administration had the invasion or the toppling of Saddam Hussein on the list of objectives early in the administration planning. The politicians battle over the planning are fascinating to read in Cobra II and is one of highest points of the book. A number of high ranking Bush administration officials from Colin Powell to Donald Rumsfeld argue over the planning. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld fought heavily with military planners and Joint Chiefs of Staff on how to invade and troop numbers. Donald Rumsfeld, who shared the idea along with Bush, did not see the need for lengthy peacekeeping and nation-building, such as the U.S. had undertaken in the Balkans under President Clinton. This viewpoint is shared by number individuals inside the higher cabinet of the administration. Many of the high ranking officials inside the administration believed in the hopelessly optimistic Central Intelligence Agency predictions that Iraq units would surrender ultimately embrace American liberators.
Because of this optimistic thinking, Rumsfeld wanted a smaller, streamlined invasion force like the one used in Afghanistan. U.S. Military leaders declared Afghanistan as a completely different war and recommended that close to 500,000 troops would be needed, especially for the post-war phase. Rumsfeld was irritated at the first presentation of such numbers, and believed 125,000, "and even that was probably too many," could do the job.
Determined to reduce the number of troops for the invading force, Rumsfeld dismissed advice from experts inside and outside government who argued for a larger contingent troops sent into Iraq. Rumsfeld’s efforts reeked havoc with the military's preparations, according to the authors. The numerous planning changes and dependence on technology caused the military to become extremely disorganized for the war. Despite the disorganization from all the planning iterations the U.S. military attacked Iraq with the number of troops Rumsfeld initially wanted completed the objective of removing Saddam Hussein from power.
However because so much planning was focused on the invasion and numbers needed to invade Iraq meant that little attention was paid to what the military terms "Phase IV," or post-conflict operations. With inadequate troop numbers to contain the anarchy that followed the fall of the Hussein regime, the US military would be the owners of a country in pure chaos. The authors interview a number of the US military leaders in Cobra II and make it clear is that with the extremely poor post war planning, combined with the lack of enough troops to restore order, caused the United States to fail the objective of rebuilding a democratic Iraq and lose the initiative in the weeks following the invasion
The authors state that planning for the rebuilding of Iraq be given to the Defense Department by Secretary Rumsfeld. However General Franks, whose responsibility it was to ensure that the United States military was prepared for the occupation, "seemed content to leave the lion's share of the Phase IV planning to others in the government," the authors write. The authors make it clear as late as Feb. 20, 2003, barely a month before the invasion, "there was no plan" for the rebuilding of Iraq.
Cobra II provides a number fascinating accounts into what went wrong in the first weeks after the fall of Baghdad. Playing out like a cheap horror film, one of the most compelling moments is when General Garner is replaced by Ambassador Paul Bremer. Paul Bremer makes a number of critical errors which leads to Iraq disorder. Thousands of Iraq men became unemployed after Bremer’s first error of abolishing the Iraq Army, which was the largest employer of the country. Then Bremer only compounds the situation by preventing the United States military from holding local elections for fear that "the wrong guy" might win.
Consequently, once American forces seized Baghdad, U.S. troop deployments were curtailed and units were instructed to prepare for a rapid drawdown—even while the Iraq police and military forces that the administration expected to preserve order were being disbanded. This occurs while U.S. field commanders realize that their principal enemy is not the Iraq army but irregular forces many of them foreigners employing guerrilla tactics are the true enemy.
Cobra II does an excellent job no placing blame entirely on one person. The complete lack of planning for the rebuilding, number of critical errors and political misjudgments all contribute to the failure in Iraq.
A number of logistical problems would also cause problems for rebuilding Iraq. The military found that destroying communications was key to quickly taking over also greatly hinder post-war operation. The little bit of planning for rebuilding Iraq was to use oil revenues to help with reconstruction. However, the Iraq oil infrastructure was almost non-existent and was the target of constant insurgent attack. As for the Iraq police, the CIA assessment was that they were apolitical and well-trained. Yet the reality was they were poorly-trained and incapable of taking security roles for Iraq.
The authors show how a number of people were not alone in making major miscalculations. They place blame on number of players from Rumsfeld wanting smaller troop numbers to Tommy Franks who refused to politically battle Rumsfeld over troop numbers. The authors’ place present an abundant list of individuals who made mistakes in judgment. The book shows the failure at the highest levels of the command structure, effected the soldiers on the ground, and the overall strategic objective. The authors do a fine job making one of the most lop-sided campaigns in memory interesting, and do not focus on a particular unit.
In one’s opinion, following the troops invading Iraq is unnecessary in Cobra II and not following the troops could have possibly shortened the 600 page book greatly. However the war stories do help to tie into bigger picture and give Cobra II a human aspect. This book does a great job in showing how the surprises that the Americans encountered in resistance turn out to be compelling at times. It would be have interesting to see the authors focus more on what was going inside the administration during the heavy post war fighting hopefully in possibly a sequel to Cobra II it would be nice to see key policymakers such as Vice President Cheney and Rumsfeld who declined the authors' requests for interviews to be interviewed. It is one’s opinion that views of those at the center of the war politically should be captured. Still, Cobra II even with its fault stands as the best account of the war to date.
Cobra II is meticulous and properly planned which is completely opposite of the war that it covers. The narrative reading is authoritative, the human aspects of conflict give the reader brief insight of the war. Cobra II offers readers a real and instructive lesson on the consequences of inadequate strategic planning. Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq, is by far the most factual, non bias, and comprehensive book written to date about the 2003 Iraq invasion.
Gordon and Trainer present the facts as they are currently known, and let the reader judge who is truly to blame for the blunder in Iraq. Cobra II is by far the best book on the subject and will likely remain so for years to come, and it will likely be the benchmark by which other histories of the Iraq invasion are measured.
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